Conclusion
The theory of reform predicts that reform municipal institutions should be less indulgent of special interests than are traditional institutions. However, reform city councils have unambiguously positive effects on city employment levels and compensation for municipal employees. These effects are inconsistent with reform predictions.
These effects are consistent with the logic of constituency-building. City council elections held under reform rules reduce the electoral effectivenes of traditional party and neighborhood constituencies. Successful candidates must therefore appeal to others. Municipal employees are one available alternative. The results above indicate that they are relatively more powerful under reform than under traditional council elections. They use this power to obtain measurable returns through the municipal labor market.
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The Social Science Research Council, through grant SS-25-83-04, and the Project in State and Local Government Finance of the National Bureau of Economic Research supported the research presented in this paper. Roo Canfield assisted, indispensably, with the empirical analysis. Linda Edwards, Jim Hines, Jonathan Leonard, Robert Lipsey and Donald Walls have been generous with constructive comments. Only I am responsible for the content.
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Zax, J.S. Reform city councils and municipal employees. Public Choice 64, 167–177 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153162
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153162