Abstract
The paper's focus is on the determinants of the U.S. wheat producer support price. The results of the time-series analysis suggest that this price is largely determined by the previous price, the expected U.S. share in world exports, and expected program costs. Presidential elections also influence U.S. wheat price policies. All other things being equal, the support price tends to be lower in election years than in other years. This suggests that small interest groups' relative political economic power may be less pronounced in election years if they do not succeed in positioning themselves on the political economic market such that they contain the potentially decisive voter.
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Research was supported by grants from the Graduate School and the Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Minnesota. The author thanks David Blandford, Daniel W. Bromley, David S. Bullock, Bruce L. Gardner, Ulrich Hausner, Alex McCalla, Arie Oskam, Willis L. Peterson, Terry L. Roe, Vernon W. Ruttan, Martin Scheele, Guenther Schmitt, and Gordon Tullock for comments on earlier drafts. Excellent research assistance was provided by Ulrich Hausner. This paper has benefitted from comments by participants of seminars at Iowa State University and the World Bank. Any remaining errors are mine.
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Von Witzke, H. Determinants of the U.S. wheat producer support price: Do presidential elections matter?. Public Choice 64, 155–165 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153161
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153161