Abstract
There are at least two frameworks within which the debate on proper institutional arrangements for regulation can be carried out. One rests on seeing the various possibilities as instruments and its central concern is with the most efficient means for achieving regulatory objectives. The second framework views regulation as an essentially political act. It focuses on adapting our choice of institutional alternatives to take account of valued features of our existing political world. It also involves an understanding of how our choice of institutional alternatives actively shapes that world and thus helps to form our regime or the way of life to which we aspire. These two frameworks are examined with special attention being given to the political view.
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Elkin, S.L. Regulation as a political question. Policy Sci 18, 95–108 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00149753
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00149753