References
Miss Anscombe makes the point in connection with her discussion of the practical syllogism: “So what can the practical syllogism have to do with ethics? It can only come into ethical studies if a correct philosophical psychology is requisite for a philosophical system of ethics: a view which I believe I should maintain if I thought of trying to construct such a system; but which I believe is not generally current.” Intention (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 78.
Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: The Viking Press, 1960), p. 67.
David Sachs, “A Few Morals About Acts,” Philosophical Review, LXXV, No. 1 (January 1966), 95.
Andrew Oldenquist, “Rules and Consequences,” Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, LXV (1964–65). Griffin writes: “[The consequentialist and intrinsicalist] misconceive what is at issue;... they present us with a false dichotomy” (182).
Hampshire, op. cit.; Donald Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” Journal of Philosophy, LX, No. 23 (7 November 1963); Eric D'Arcy, Human Acts (Oxford: The Calrendon Press, 1963); Oldenquist, op. cit.; Jonathan Bennett, “Whatever The Consequences,” Analysis, XXVI, No. 3 (January 1966); Griffin, op. cit.; Y. N. Chopra, “The Consequences of Human Actions,” Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, LXV (1964–65); Daniel Bennett, “Action, Reason, and Purpose,” Journal of Philosophy, LXII, No. 4 (1965); John Ladd, “The Ethical Dimensions of The Concept of Action,” Journal of Philosophy, LXII, No. 21 (1965).
Oldenquist, op. cit., 180–181.
Ibid., 183.
Ibid., 182.
Ibid., 184.
Ladd, op. cit.
Ibid., 644.
Bennett, op. cit., 92.
Gerald Dworkin and David Blumenfeld, “Punishment for Intentions,” Mind, LXXV, No. 299 July 1966.
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Macklin, R. Actions, consequences and ethical theory. J Value Inquiry 1, 72–80 (1967). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00149467
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00149467