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We are grateful to Marcelle Chauvet, Marvin Goodfriend, Stefano Manzocchi, Jiannis Venieris and an anonymous referee for comments. The usual caveat about errors applies.
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Singh, H., Zak, P. Preliminary evidence on the determinants of Federal Reserve open market operations. Public Choice 74, 317–338 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00149182
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00149182