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Multiproduct activity and competition policy: The Tetra Pak case

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Abstract

We suggest the Tetra Pak case as a real-world example to study the implications of multiproduct activity for European Competition Policy. Tetra Pak, a monopolist in aseptic carton packaging of liquid food, competes with Elopak in the nonaseptic sector. The EC Commission used the effect of Tetra Pak's dominance in the aseptic sector on its rival's performance as an evidence of the former's anticompetitive behavior. With linear demand and cost functions and interdependent demands, the Commission's position can be supported. However, a more general model suggests that the Commission's conclusions cannot be supported as the unique outcome of the analysis of the information available.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departamento de Economica, Universitat Jaume I, Campus de Penyeta Roja, Castellón, Spain

    Aurora García Gallego

  2. Departamento de Economica, Universitat Jaume I, Campus de Penyeta Roja, Castellón, Spain

    Nikolaos Georgantzis

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  1. Aurora García Gallego
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  2. Nikolaos Georgantzis
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Gallego, A.G., Georgantzis, N. Multiproduct activity and competition policy: The Tetra Pak case. Eur J Law Econ 3, 83–95 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00149084

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00149084

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