Abstract
Two new justice constraints on liberal rights and the Pareto rule are proposed and analysed. Each resolves both Sen and Gibbard paradoxes. The first, following Hammond, requires no axiom of identity. The second, following Sen and Suppes, resolves Sen Paradoxes for two rights, but requires the axiom of complete identity to resolve Gibbard paradoxes and Sen Paradoxes with three or more rights. This second constraint therefore turns social conflicts over rights into disagreements about interpersonal and intersituational comparisons. By itself it solves the majoritarian paradox and the all-but-one-person-is-decisive paradox.
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Macintyre, I. Justice, liberty, unanimity and the axioms of identity. Theor Decis 24, 225–237 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00148956
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00148956