Abstract
Technology and human behavior can influence the effectiveness of safety policies. In the field of traffic safety, rational-choice theorists postulate that automobile safety devices induce increased driver risk taking. Such behavioral responses could partly or totally nullify the lifesaving potential of governmental safety rules for new cars, such as the crashworthiness standards adopted by the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This study explores the behavioral-response hypothesis in the context of a car-vintage model of U.S. car occupant death rates. Results from the model imply that U.S. standards have reduced the occupant death rate by roughly 30 percent, a finding consistent with minimal driver response to safety devices. The study provides support for the technological approach to safety policy and suggests that policymakers might consider adopting additional crashworthiness regulations, such as some form of passive-restraint program.
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Financial support was provided by the Economic Studies Program, Brookings Institution. I thank Robert W. Crandall, Steven Garber, Lawrence Summers, and the editors for comments. All views and residual errors are solely my responsibility.
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Graham, J.D. Technology, behavior, and safety: An empirical study of automobile occupant-protection regulation. Policy Sci 17, 141–151 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00146925
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00146925