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Retention and retirement: The case of the U.S. military

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Abstract

The military retirement system provides an immediate, lifetime, inflation-protected annuity to personnel who complete 20 or more years of service. The cost of this system has risen substantially in the past 15 years, and the system's actuarial costs now comprise almost one-third of total military manpower costs. Because of its importance in the total military compensation system, the military retirement system exerts a significant influence on the age structure of the force and on personnel turnover patterns. This article evaluates the relative efficiency of the current retirement system by comparing it with two recently proposed alternatives, one by a presidential commission and one by the Department of Defense. It estimates the impact of these proposed alternatives on the military personnel force structure and on manpower costs. It is concluded that these alternatives would provide a force as capable as today's force at significantly lower cost.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Congressional Budget Office, USA

    John H. Enns

  2. Systems Research and Applications Corporation, USA

    Gary R. Nelson

  3. Clemson University, USA

    John T. Warner

Authors
  1. John H. Enns
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  2. Gary R. Nelson
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  3. John T. Warner
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Additional information

Order of authorship determined alphabetically. This paper presents results of analysis conducted while Enns and Nelson were associated with the Department of Defense and Warner was on the staff at the Center for Naval Analyses. The views presented herein are those of the authors.

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Enns, J.H., Nelson, G.R. & Warner, J.T. Retention and retirement: The case of the U.S. military. Policy Sci 17, 101–121 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00146923

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00146923

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