Theory and Decision

, Volume 15, Issue 2, pp 161–197 | Cite as

Condorcet's paradox

  • William V. Gehrlein


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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Co 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • William V. Gehrlein
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Business AdministrationUniversity of DelawareNewarkU.S.A.

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