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The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism

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Abstract

In this paper, the problem of the Paretian liberal is cast as a preference revelation game whose outcome function satisfies Gibbard's libertarian condition and strong Pareto optimality. Strategic consistency requires that the equilibrium of the game agree with the sincere outcome. It is shown that, whether viewed in a cooperative or non-cooperative context, the liberal social choice function is strategically inconsistent. This result suggests that, from a strategic standpoint, a different resolution of the liberal paradox is desirable.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Iowa State University, Ames, USA

    Roy Gardner

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  1. Roy Gardner
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Additional information

The author wishes to thank Alan Gibbard, Nicholas Miller, Prasanta Pattanaik, Kenneth Shepsle, Philip Straffin and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments.

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Gardner, R. The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism. Public Choice 35, 241–252 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140847

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