Abstract
The traditional or “orthodox” decision rule of maximizing conditional expected utility has recently come under attack by critics who advance alternative “causal” decision theories. The traditional theory has, however, been defended. And these defenses have in turn been criticized. Here, I examine two objections to such defenses and advance a theory about the dynamics of deliberation (a diachronic theory about the process of deliberation) within the framework of which both objections to the defenses of the traditional theory fail.
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Eells, E. Metatickles and the dynamics of deliberation. Theor Decis 17, 71–95 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140057
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140057