Abstract
Many regulatory agencies were established during the Progressive Era and the New Deal, in part out of faith in their capacity to regulate industry in an apolitical and “scientific” fashion. A number of observers—most notably Marver Bernstein—have noted that many regulatory agencies eventually become “captured” by the very interests they are supposedly regulating. This paper first examines the notion of “clientele capture,” focusing in particular on the development of an operational classification of regulatory policies. It then builds upon Bernstein's suggestion that the cycle of decay commences with the demise of the constituency supporting regulation. Through case studies an effort is made to explore (1) the conditions under which a regulatory agency is likely to actively attempt to develop a supportive constituency and (2) the conditions under which a constituency supportive of aggressive regulation is able to effectively monitor regulatory policy (and to be instrumental in preventing slippage) after the decline in public concern with the issue.
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A number of people have, through their comments and criticisms, improved the quality of this paper. They include J. David Greenstone and Herbert Storing of the University of Chicago, Theodore Lowi of Cornell University, and Daniel Mazmanian of the Brookings Institution, all of whom commented extensively on the dissertation from which it was drawn. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association. I wish to thank Louise Comfort of Golden State University, Edward Corrigan of the University of Denver, Robert Ross of Chico State University, Judith Hartman of Portland State University, and Richard Pattenaude of Drake University for their comments. A number of colleagues at the University of California, Davis, have also provided several helpful criticisms; they include Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith, Angus MacIntyre, Edward Vine, and Vance Merrill. Finally, Kai Lee of the University of Washington has made numerous suggestions, both in tone and in substance.
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Sabatier, P. Social movements and regulatory agencies: Toward a more adequate—and less pessimistic—Theory of “clientele capture”. Policy Sci 6, 301–342 (1975). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139972
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139972