, Volume 2, Issue 1, pp 73–85

Framework for formal ontology

  • Barry Smith
  • Kevin Mulligan

DOI: 10.1007/BF00139703

Cite this article as:
Smith, B. & Mulligan, K. Topoi (1983) 2: 73. doi:10.1007/BF00139703


The discussions which follow rest on a distinction, first expounded by Husserl, between formal logic and formal ontology. The former concerns itself with (formal) meaning-structures; the latter with formal structures amongst objects and their parts. The paper attempts to show how, when formal ontological considerations are brought into play, contemporary extensionalist theories of part and whole, and above all the mereology of Leśniewski, can be generalised to embrace not only relations between concrete objects and object-pieces, but also relations between what we shall call dependent parts or moments. A two-dimensional formal language is canvassed for the resultant ontological theory, a language which owes more to the tradition of Euler, Boole and Venn than to the quantifier-centred languages which have predominated amongst analytic philosophers since the time of Frege and Russell. Analytic philosophical arguments against moments, and against the entire project of a formal ontology, are considered and rejected. The paper concludes with a brief account of some applications of the theory presented.

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Co. 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • Barry Smith
  • Kevin Mulligan

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations