Democracy and interdependent preferences

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In a democracy, the views and wishes of the citizens are to count. The problem here is how this dictum is to be understood. I suggest that a proper analysis requires that each person's preferences be seen in the context of his beliefs concerning the preferences of the others and of the preferences he would have if he held different beliefs. Preferences founded on erroneous beliefs call for special consideration. So also do certain reluctantly held preferences. I propose a decision-policy involving the identification of social equilibria of preference.

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Schick, F. Democracy and interdependent preferences. Theor Decis 3, 55–75 (1972) doi:10.1007/BF00139354

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  • Special Consideration
  • Proper Analysis
  • Erroneous Belief
  • Social Equilibrium
  • Interdependent Preference