Abstract
This study examines the roles of the executive budgetary proposal, the executive veto, the legislative override, and legislative uncertainty about the executive's preferences in determining the outcome of a budgetary process. A sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional agents — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive — is presented. To focus attention on the executive proposal, the veto, the override provision, and uncertainty, simplifying assumptions are made: (1) the appropriations committee has monopoly agenda power, and (2) there is a closed amendment control rule. In order to characterize sequential equilibria of various combinations of veto rules and override provisions, we examine a particular arrangement of agents' preferences and a two item budget. The results demonstrate that the final budget depends critically on the executive proposal, the executive veto rule, the override provision, and the uncertainty. We achieve three striking results. First, the executive proposal may be effective in reducing the frequency of the exercised veto. Second, for a given override provision, a movement from the item veto to the item reduction veto leaves the executive worse off in some cases. Third, with the same change in institutions, the government budget may increase.
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We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Nancy Barrett, Larry Samuelson, and David Schap.
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Dearden, J.A., Husted, T.A. Executive budget proposal, executive veto, legislative override, and uncertainty: A comparative analysis of the budgetary process. Public Choice 65, 1–19 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139288
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139288