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Terrorism and the law: Historical contexts, contemporary dilemmas, and the end(s) of democracy

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Abstract

Recent proposals by the G7 (and Russia) to clamp down on “terrorists” and “terrorism” do not define that which is prohibited. Instead, a threat is communicated which in turn allows, among other things, greater attention to be paid officially to “camouflage” charities and “terrorist” use of the Internet. Nevertheless, it is somewhat of a truism to note that terrorist violence is ultimately defined or characterized, for purposes of legal prohibition, within a highly politicized atmosphere. Starting with a short summary of “anti-terrorist” codification efforts made this century, this article examines some of the “security interests” cited by governments today in their respective struggles against “terrorism”. More specifically, it is argued that individual perceptions of personal and societal threat are heightened unnecessarily not only by a constant stream of governmental “anti-terrorist” rhetoric, but further, by an awareness of official and unofficial methods of “anti-terrorist” surveillance, and the use to which the information so obtained can be put.

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References

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  92. Supra, notes 7 and 79. This presumably extends to “internal security” arrangements.

  93. N. Chomsky, supra, note 59, 89.

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    Elizabeth Chadwick

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Chadwick, E. Terrorism and the law: Historical contexts, contemporary dilemmas, and the end(s) of democracy. Crime Law Soc Change 26, 329–350 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138900

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