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Nuclear deterrence: Bankrupt ideology

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Abstract

This article argues that nuclear deterrence is a contemporary ideology (an elaborately-developed set of convictions, socio-politically central, stable over time, idealistic in intent, widely and emotionally embraced). And vulnerable. Vulnerable to the critique of the social scientist who can raise questions about the reliability of nuclear deterrence as a cornerstone. Vulnerable to the critique of the moral philosopher who can raise important questions about the propriety of nuclear deterrence and the programmatic activities it underlies.

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Stegenga, J.A. Nuclear deterrence: Bankrupt ideology. Policy Sci 16, 127–145 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138347

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138347

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