Conclusions
Results of this study are consistent with those of previous voting studies which have shown that party, ideology, and constituency characteristics are often significant explanatory variables in equations to explain voting. No evidence was found to support the hypothesis that congressmen's voting decisions depend upon their private financial interests. This suggests the conclusion that much of the concern about apparent conflicts of interest is unfounded, but it must be recognized that this study has examined voting on just a few issues and has used data on financial holdings which were lacking in precision. As more data becomes available in the next several years, we should be able to resolve this question with greater confidence.
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The research assistance of Thomas Eche is gratefully acknowledged, as is financial support from the Research Grants Committee of the College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Alabama.
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Chappell, H.W. Conflict of interest and congressional voting: A note. Public Choice 37, 331–335 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138252
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138252