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A proof of Hume's separation thesis based on a formal system for descriptive and normative statements

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Abstract

A formal system for descriptive and normative statements is given based on first-order predicate calculus augmented by deontic operators. Hume's separation thesis is then given the following formulation and proved in ℒ: there is no theorem in ℒ of the form P ⊃ M where P is a consistent descriptive statement and M is a normative statement. We attempt to show that the formal system is actually true for the intended model by giving an interpretation of the formal system. It turns out that there are three mutually exclusive classes of statements; namely, descriptive statements, statements equivalent to purely normative statements, and hybrid statements. It is shown that theories that have not offered a proper treatment of hybrid statements have led to a great deal of confusion in the past. A brief discussion of the philosophical importance of the results is given.

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Johanson, A.A. A proof of Hume's separation thesis based on a formal system for descriptive and normative statements. Theor Decis 3, 339–350 (1973). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138192

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