Abstract
Unemployment insurance (UI) laws have recently come under considerable criticism for fostering employment disincentives. Imperfections in the experience rating tax schedule has been the primary causal factor behind most of these allegations. In particular, the insurance subsidies created by the tax schedule have been blamed for distorted labor markets and for increased layoffs.
This article proposes that a property rights system be established for UI reserves which would enable a firm with an unemployment insurance reserve surplus to lend voluntarily to a firm in need of reserves. Such a system would allocate reserves more efficiently and eliminate some of the disincentives effects of the current unemployment insurance scheme. A property rights system would be a second best solution to perfecting the present unemployment insurance system and making it actuarially sound. However, assigning rights to UI reserves can be implemented without challenging the special interests of the politically dominant industries that have been responsible for maintaining the imperfections in the UI system for 50 years.
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Cottle, R.L., Macaulay, H.H. Property rights and unemployment insurance reserves. Policy Sci 18, 127–139 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136717
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136717