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Agent discretion, regulatory policymaking, and different institutional arrangements

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Abstract

This paper examines agent discretion that is a result of the structure of the legislative process. Based on several distributions of lawmaking powers, different games are analyzed in which players decide on regulatory policies. The analysis shows that agent discretion increases as lawmaking powers are differentiated and assigned to specialized players. Particularly, monopoly initiation power, which allows a player to act as a gatekeeper, has a substantial impact on discretion. Agent discretion will be even larger when these players also have heterogenous preferences. The framework that is developed in this paper permits comparisons across different political systems with regard to agent discretion and legislative control on policymaking.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Public Administration and Public Policy, University of Twente, 7500 AE, Enschede, The Netherlands

    Bernard Steunenberg

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  1. Bernard Steunenberg
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I think Patrick Dunleavy, Martin van Hees, Manfred Holler, Mary Olson, an anonymous referee, and participants at seminars at the University of Twente, the Netherlands, the University of Hamburg, Germany, the London School of Economics and Political Science, the 1994 Public Choice Society Meeting in Austin, Texas, and the 1994 Summerschool of the Netherlands Institute of Government, for helpful comments and suggestions.

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Steunenberg, B. Agent discretion, regulatory policymaking, and different institutional arrangements. Public Choice 86, 309–339 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136524

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