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Games presidents do and do not play: Presidential circumvention of the executive branch budget process

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Abstract

The federal executive budgetary process has been severely criticized in recent years for its apparent inability to curb budgetary growth and limit deficits. Much of this criticism ignores the essentially political, rather than administrative, causes of these trends. Budgetary growth and deficit spending may be viewed in part as the results of presidential circumvention of budgetary and fiscal policy processes. Circumvention consists of the movement of spending decisions out of the annual review and evaluation of current-year budgetary formulation, thus evading the constraints frequently imposed by budgetary and fiscal policies. The precise mechanisms of presidential circumvention have changed over time. However, the long-term impact of circumvention has been a reduction in the controllability and comprehensiveness of the annual federal budget, as well as higher rates of budgetary growth.

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Mowery, D.C., Kamlet, M.S. Games presidents do and do not play: Presidential circumvention of the executive branch budget process. Policy Sci 16, 303–327 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135952

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