Conclusion
The analyses of explanation and causal beliefs are heavily dependent on using probability functions as models of epistemic states. There are, however, several aspects of beliefs that are not captured by such a representation and which affect the outcome of the analyses.
One dimension that has been neglected in this article is the temporal aspect of the beliefs. The description of a single event naturally involves the time it occurred. Some analyses of causation postulate that the cause must not occur later than the effect. If we want this kind of causality it is easy to add the appropriate clause to (CAUS). An alternative is not to rule out backwards causation or causal loops a priori, but expect that (CAUS), via the properties of the contraction P -C , will result in the desired temporal relation between C and E. One way of ensuring this is to postulate that when the probability function P is contracted to P -C , the probabilities of all events that occurred before C remain the same in P -C as in P. This means that all beliefs about the history of events up to C are left unaltered in the construction of the hypothetical state of belief P -C .
In conclusion, I hope to have shown that, in spite of these limitations, (EXP) and (CAUS) provide viable analyses of explanation and causality between single events for the case when epistemic states can be described by probability functions. I have also shown that the two analyses can be used to explicate the close connections between the two notions. These analyses reduce the problems of explanation and causality, hopefully in a non-circular way, to the problem of identifying contractions of states of belief.
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Gärdenfors, P. An epistemic analysis of explanations and causal beliefs. Topoi 9, 109–124 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135892
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135892