Abstract
This paper is devoted to the explanation of tax policy from a behavioural-theoretic point of view. It, for the first time, brings together within a unified framework behavioural determinants of government expenditure, taxation, and tax reform. Administrative and compliance costs associated with taxation (factors generally neglected in models of taxation), as well as tax avoidance/evasion, deadweight losses, and the costs that are involved in the tax reform process itself, play a crucial role in the model. The paper investigates how these factors influence the development of taxation and expenditure, and the occurrence of tax reform.
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Van Velthoven, B., Van Winden, F. A positive model of tax reform. Public Choice 72, 61–86 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135547
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135547