Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Lobbying and the measurement of conventional welfare cost

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Atkinson, A. and Stiglitz, J. (1980). Lectures in public economics. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Browne, W. (1988). Private interests, public policy, and American agriculture. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.

    Google Scholar 

  • Browning, E. (1987). On the marginal welfare cost of taxation. American Economic Review 77 (March): 11–23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Corcoran, W. and Karels, G. (1985). Rent-seeking behavior in the long-run. Public Choice 46: 227–246.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cornes, R. and Sandler, T. (1986). The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hillman, A. and Riley, J. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1 (Spring): 17–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laband, D. and Sophocleus, J. (1988). The social cost of rent-seeking: First estimates. Public Choice 58: 269–276.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics 19 (August): 211–240.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner, R. (1975). The social costs of monopoly and regulation. Journal of Political Economy 83 (August): 807–828.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shoven, J. and Whalley, J. (1984). Applied general-equilibrium models of taxation and international trade. Journal of Economic Literature 2 (September): 1007–1051.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stern, P. (1988). The best Congress money can buy. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, G. (1974). Free riders and collective action: An appendix to theories of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5 (Autumn): 359–365.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal 5 (June): 224–232.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G. (1989). The economics of special privilege and rent-seeking. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent-seeking. In J. Buchanan, R. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, 97–112. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Varian, H. (1989). Measuring the deadweight costs of DUP and rent-seeking activities. Economics and Politics 1 (Spring): 81–95.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Arizona State University, 85287-3806, Tempe, AZ

    Roger L. Faith

Authors
  1. Roger L. Faith
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

I would like to thank Michael Ormiston, Janet Smith and Scott Smith for several helpful discussions.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Faith, R.L. Lobbying and the measurement of conventional welfare cost. Public Choice 72, 23–36 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135544

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135544

Keywords

Search

Navigation