Journal of Regulatory Economics

, Volume 4, Issue 4, pp 299–319 | Cite as

Capacity-contingent nonlinear pricing by regulated firms

  • Daniel F. Spulber


Second-best Pareto optimal pricing by a regulated firm subject to demand and capacity shocks is examined. Nonlinear price schedules for the firm's customers are obtained that are contingent on capacity realizations. The second-best Pareto optimal mechanism also is implemented by an allocation mechanism based on the consumer's choice of a minimum demand or firm power level. The optimal mechanism is implemented as well by a general form of priority pricing.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel F. Spulber
    • 1
  1. 1.Northwestern University J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Leverone HallEvanstonUSA

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