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The geometry of justice: Three existence and uniqueness theorems

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Abstract

Various intuitive notions of justice are characterized in terms of geometry. Three approaches to justice (Utilitaran, Rawlsian and Nash) are considered. A set of qualities which we might want a justice approach to have is presented. Three different subsets of these qualities are shown to be uniquely satisfied (out of all possible approaches) by a different one of the three approaches considered.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept of Economics, Merrill College, University of California, 95064, Santa Cruz, CA, U.S.A.

    Donald Wittman

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  1. Donald Wittman
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Wittman, D. The geometry of justice: Three existence and uniqueness theorems. Theor Decis 16, 239–250 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134649

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