Abstract
We examine a setting where a different regulatory commission controls the activities of a firm in each of two periods. Each commission is concerned primarily with the welfare of contemporary consumers. We examine the efficacy of three different regulatory charters in resolving the intertemporal conflicts that arise between commissions. These charters specify the extent to which the second-period commission is bound to promises made by its predecessor.
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Lewis, T.R., Sappington, D.E.M. Sequential regulatory oversight. J Regul Econ 2, 327–348 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134475
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134475