Abstract
Schematic conflict occurs when evidence is interpreted in different ways (for example, by different people, who have learned to approach the given evidence with different schemata). Such conflicts are resolved either by weighting some schemata more heavily than others, or by finding common-ground inferences for several schemata, or by a combination of these two processes. Belief functions, interpreted as representations of evidence strength, provide a natural model for weighting schemata, and can be utilized in several distinct ways to compute common-ground inferences. In two examples, different computations seem to be required for reasonable common-ground inference. In the first, competing scientific theories produce distinct, logically independent inferences based on the same data. In this example, the simple product of the competing belief functions is a plausible evaluation of common ground. In the second example (sensitivity analysis), the conflict is among alternative statistical assumptions. Here, a product of belief functions will not do, but the upper envelope of normalized likelihood functions provides a reasonable definition of common ground. Different inference contexts thus seem to require different methods of conflict resolution. A class of such methods is described, and one characteristic property of this class is proved.
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Ray, B.K., Krantz, D.H. Foundations of the theory of evidence: Resolving conflict among schemata. Theor Decis 40, 215–234 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134208
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134208