Abstract
This paper uses a particular choice rule over sets of alternatives under the Pareto rule. Starting from the sincere situation every strategic misrevelation of preference is shown to be an improvement for all voters. The existence of an equilibrium under successive misrepresentations by sincere voters is demonstrated.
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MacIntyre, I. The Pareto rule and strategic voting. Theor Decis 31, 1–19 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134130
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134130