Abstract
In this paper, a problem for utility theory - that it would have an agent who was compelled to play “Russian Roulette’ with one revolver or another, to pay as much to have a six-shooter with four bullets relieved of one bullet before playing with it, as he would be willing to pay to have a six-shooter with two bullets emptied - is reviewed. A less demanding Bayesian theory is described, that would have an agent maximize expected values of possible total consequence of his actions. And utility theory is located within that theory as valid for agents who satisfy certain formal conditions, that is, for agents who are, in terms of that more general theory, indifferent to certain dimensions of ‘risk’. Raiffa- and Savage-style arguments for its more general validity are then resisted. Addenda are concerned with implications for game theory, and relations between ‘utilities’ and ‘values’.
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Sobel, J.H. Utility theory and the Bayesian paradigm. Theor Decis 26, 263–293 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134109
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134109