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Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance

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  1. University of Alberta, Canada

    B. G. Dahlby

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  1. B. G. Dahlby
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I would like to thank an anonymous referee for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Dahlby, B.G. Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance. Public Choice 37, 547–558 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133751

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