Expected utility with perturbed lotteries
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The sensitivity of expected utility choice to slight variations in the description of lotteries is considered. This sensitivity is allowed to influence actual choice in what is called the expected utility with perturbed lotteries model because the slight variations are used to represent vagueness regarding the dollar-prize, probability description of a lottery. Example illustrate how this sensitivity can affect actual choice for an otherwise expected utility decision-maker and provide an explanation for some of the anomolous evidence on risky choice.
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