Abstract
While the theory of public goods points to socially suboptimal contributions by agents acting under Cournot assumptions, this externality can be rectified by the introduction of positive interdependence of actions to the individual's choice calculus. This paper draws attention to the fact that the institution of democratic voting is itself a means of transforming the individual calculus in such a way that parameter changes are evaluated as simultaneous adjustments by the group, on the side of benefits, but by the individual only, on the side of costs, thus generating optimal parameter preference in the case of identical agents.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Chamberlin, John: 1974, ‘Provision of collective Goods as a Function of Group Size’, American Political Science Review 68, 707–716.
Green, J. and Laffont, J. -J.: 1977, ‘Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revalation of Preferences for Public Goods’, Econometrica 45, 427–438.
Groves, T. and Ledyard, J.: 1977, ‘Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the “Free Rider” Problem’, Econometrica 45, 783–809.
Guttman, Joel M.: 1978, ‘Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior’, American Economic Review 68, 251–255.
Kant, I.: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, Translated by T. K. Abbott, 3rd Edition, Longmans, London.
Kramer, G. H.: 1973, ‘On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule’, Econometrica 41, 285–297.
Olson, Mancur: 1965, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Plott, C. R.: 1967, ‘A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule’, American Economic Review 57, 787–806.
Samuelson, Paul: 1954, ‘The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’, Review of Economics and Statistics 36, 387–389.
Sen, Amartya K.: 1969, ‘A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Theories of Collectivism in Allocation’, pp. 1–77 in T. Majumdar (ed.), Growth and Choice, Oxford University Press, Calcutta.
Sen, Amartya K.: 1973, ‘Behavior and the Concept of Preference’, Economica 40, 241–259.
Sen, Amartya K.: 1974, ‘Choice, Orderings and Morality’, in Stephen Körner, (ed.), Practical Reason, Yale University Press, New Haven.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Putterman, L. A note on the relationship of interdependent action to the optimality of certain voting decisions. Theor Decis 17, 257–265 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00132610
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00132610