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Welfare functions and group decisions

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Abstract

The paper shows that Pareto optimal sharing rules imply that group decisions will be made unanimously. An example is given.

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References

  • Borch, K.: 1962, ‘Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market’, Econometrica 30, 424–444.

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  • Fishburn, P. C.: 1984, ‘On Harsanyi's Utilitarian Cardinal Welfare Theorem’, Theory and Decision 17, 21–28.

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  • Harsanyi, J. C.: 1955, ‘Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility’, Journal of Political Economy 63, 309–321.

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  • Wilson, R.: 1968, ‘The Theory of Syndicates’, Econometrica 36, 119–132.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Norwegian School of Business, Helleveien 30, N-5035, Bergen, Norway

    Karl Borch

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  1. Karl Borch
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Borch, K. Welfare functions and group decisions. Theor Decis 17, 207–210 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00132607

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00132607

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