Hinlänglichkeit und notwendigkeit im moralischen. Ein beitrag zur logik konsequentialistischer werttheorien

Abstract

This paper contrasts different definitions of extrinsic values in terms of intrinsic ones. I define the right and the bidden as extrinsic goods, the wrong and the forbidden as extrinsic bads. There are two possibilities for doing this: an extrinsic good (bad) is a means which is (i) either necessary or (ii) sufficient to realize the intrinsic good (bad). Thus defined, right and bidden have different logical properties, the same holds with wrong and forbidden. Likewise the logical relations between right and wrong differ from those between bidden and forbidden, and those between right and forbidden are different from the relations between bidden and wrong. The paper concludes with a study of the logical features of the question whether doing the bidden and refraining from the forbidden suffices for morally right action.