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Justice-constrained libertarian claims and Pareto efficient collective decisions

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Abstract

This paper discusses justice-constrained libertarian claims that were proposed as a way to circumvent the impossibility of the Paretian liberal. Since most of the results are negative in character, we suggest an alternative route: A requirement on the structure of individual orderings should be combined with the idea that under particular circumstances individual decisiveness should be controlled by higher-order principles.

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Helpful suggestions from an anonymous referee of this journal are gratefully acknowledged.

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Gaertner, W. Justice-constrained libertarian claims and Pareto efficient collective decisions. Erkenntnis 23, 1–17 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00131951

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00131951

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