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Conditionals, uncertain rules and belief revision

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Abstract

We look at some logical theories for modelling rules that have exceptions. We argue that a system based on belief revision may provide the most appropriate theoretical basis for formal theories of user modelling.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London, 327 Mile End Road, E1 4NS, London, UK

    M. R. B. Clarke

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  1. M. R. B. Clarke
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Clarke, M.R.B. Conditionals, uncertain rules and belief revision. Artif Intell Rev 5, 71–88 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00129536

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