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Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice rules

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Brown University, Providence, USA

    Allan M. Feldman

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  1. Allan M. Feldman
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This paper was mainly written while I was visiting at the University of Virginia in 1978.

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Feldman, A.M. Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice rules. Public Choice 35, 503–509 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00128127

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