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Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising

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Congleton, R.D. Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising. Public Choice 49, 249–263 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00127342

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00127342

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