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A mistaken argument against the expected utility theory of rationality

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References

  • Allais, Maurice (1979a) ‘The Foundations of a Positive Theory of Choice Involving Risk and a Criticism of the Postulates and Axioms of the American School’ in Allais and Hagen (1979), pp. 27–145, a translation of ‘Fondements d'une théorie positive des choix comportant un risque et critique des postulats et axiomes de l'École Américaine’ in Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Econométrie, Colloque Internationaux Vol XL, 1953, pp. 257–332.

  • Allais, Maurice (1979b) ‘The So-Called Allais Paradox and Rational Decisions Under Uncertainty’ in Allais and Hagen (1979) pp. 437–681.

  • Allais, Maurice and Hagen, Ole, eds. (1979), Expected Utility Hypothesis and the Allais Paradox, Reidel.

  • Machina, Mark (1981), ‘“Rational” Decision Making versus “Rational” Decision Modelling?’, Journal of Mathematical Psychology XXIV, pp. 163–175.

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Broome, J. A mistaken argument against the expected utility theory of rationality. Theor Decis 18, 313–318 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126597

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