Abstract
The present paper deals with the Galbraithian theory of the managerial firm. Galbraith has stressed corporate size and has questioned the effectiveness of the market demand, technology and capital market constraints, which in conventional theory restrict the size of the firm.
Galbraith represents the objectives of the corporation in terms of a conventional lexicographic objective function with some minimal level of profits (in terms of cash flow) being ranked the dominant objective. Also in his treatment of the corporate constraints, Galbraith does not move much beyond the current state of knowledge. The assumption of consumer sovereignty has long been relegated to the ‘text-book literature’, and the firm's control over the quality of its product (its price elasticity) has been generally recognized. Similarly, it has been known that the capital market is not perfect so that it is unlikely to constrain the expansion of the firm with some given investor determined earning constraint. In his attempt to show the technostructure's ability to ‘plan’ the rate and the direction of the technological development Galbraith did not, however, meet with wide support from empirical research and analysis. It is extremely difficult to test the firm's control over its production technology, and while the few industry studies available can hardly be used to reject the Galbraithian position, there is not sufficient evidence to support a generalization of Galbraith's conjecture.
While individually these constraints have been analyzed and discussed in the literature, Galbraith has combined these results and has been able to show that in the industrial state the ‘qualitative laws’ of economic common sense do not hold. The importance of this conclusion is not only academic. Efforts to control corporate allocations through rate controls, antitrust litigation, and in other ways emanate from the conventional theory of firms and markets and do not ‘fit’ the industrial state. In this state corporate size does matter and cannot be treated as random: The larger the corporation the more perfect the control it assumes over its environment and the higher the efficiency with which it plans its over-all operations.
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Iwand, T., Thomassen, H. Galbraith's theory of the mature corporation. Theor Decis 10, 331–351 (1979). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126346
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126346