Abstract
Popper's account of situational explanations is contrasted with the models of Dray and Hempel. Popper's Rationality Principle has the unusual feature of positing causal connections between objective ideas (world 3) and human behaviour (world 1).
Popper's methodological policy concerning the Rationality Principle seems to be in direct conflict with his general theory of scientific method. However, I argue that Popper has underestimated the empirical content and criticizability of the Rationality Principle.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Bibliography
Dray, W. H., Laws and Explanation in History, Oxford University Press, London, 1957.
Hempel, C. G., Aspects of Scientific Explanation, Free Press, New York, 1965.
Koertge, N., ‘On Popper's Philosophy of Social Science’, in K. F. Schaffner and R. S. Cohen (eds.), PSA 1972, Vol. XX: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1974, pp. 195–207.
Kohlberg, L., ‘Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education’, in C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (eds.), Moral Education, University of Toronto Press, 1971, pp. 23–92.
Lakatos, I., ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 91–196.
Lee, W., Decision Theory and Human Behavior, Wiley, New York, 1971.
Popper, K. R., The Logic of Scientific Discovery, English ed., Hutchinson, London, 1959.
Popper, K. R., The Poverty of Historicism, 3rd ed., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961.
Popper, K. R., The Open Society and Its Enemies, 4th ed., Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962.
Popper, K. R., Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963.
Popper, K. R., ‘La rationalité et le statut du principe de rationalité’, in E. M. Classen (ed.), Les Fondements Philosophiques des Systèmes Economiques, Payot, Paris, 1967, pp. 142–50.
Popper, K. R., Objective Knowledge, Oxford University Press, London, 1972.
Schilpp, P. A. (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Vol. XIV, The Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court, La Salle, 1974.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D., ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’, Science 185 (1974) 1124–31.
Wason, P. C. and Johnson-Laird, P. N., Psychology of Reasoning: Structure and Content, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1972.
Watkins, J. W. N., ‘Imperfect Rationality’, in R. Borger and F. Cioffi (eds.), Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 167–217.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Koertge, N. The methodological status of Popper's rationality principle. Theor Decis 10, 83–95 (1979). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126332
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126332