Abstract
Merely because voting takes place in a real-life social decision system, we are not thereby confronted by a ‘voting game’. Often we are confronted by something that looks more like an advising game, in which voting is mainly important as a language by which policymakers render advice to other policymakers (possibly including their own future selves) who will act later. In this brief research note, the foregoing theme is illustrated by re-interpreting the same case from ancient Roman senatorial politics which inspired Robin Farquharson's seminal Theory of Voting. I stress that the contributions of this article lie entirely in the interpretation of allegedly gamelike situations, not in the formal analysis of games proper.
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Farquharson, F. (1969). Theory of voting. New Haven: Yale.
Matthews, D.R., and Stimson, J.A. (1975). Yeas and neas: Normal decision-making in the U.S. House of Representatives. New York: Wiley.
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I am in debt to Douglas Rae, Gerald Kramer, and Martin Shubik for teaching me what I know of the theory of games. If that doesn't seem like much, the fault is mine, not theirs. I would also like to thank Gary Cox, Gordon Tullock, and Harrison Wagner for criticisms which I have tried (with whatever success) to absorb.
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Budziszewski, J. Persuading Caesar: A new interpretation of Farquharson's problem. Public Choice 51, 129–140 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125994
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125994