Conclusion
Our approach to the explanation of the growth of government achieves three things: it ties together under the protection heading most government expenditure programs; it explains the timing of the growth of government; and it resolves the paradox of democratic government not serving the majority interest.
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Bordo, M.D., Landau, D. The growth of government: A protection explanation. Public Choice 53, 167–174 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125847
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125847