Conclusions
The disaggregated study confirms earlier aggregated studies showing that unemployment strongly affects the popularity of the Swedish government. The results presented here, however, suggest that there are differences among popularity functions estimated across groups differing in age, income and gender. Consequently, popularity functions estimated at an aggregated level ignore reaction patterns within various groups in society.
Age: A smaller part of the variation in popularity was explained for the youngest and the oldest age groups than for the middle age groups. Older voters appear to be less influenced by economic factors than other groups. They are economically less influenced by changes in unemployment and probably have party loyalties and political beliefs that remain less affected by economic events. The young voters are influenced as much as those 25–39 and 40–49 years of age by unemployment. Since the young show a much greater variability in their political allegiances, the unemployment variable explains much less of the variation. Young voters may be more strongly affected by issues other than economic ones, e.g., the nuclear power issue, Vietnam, etc.
Income: A comparison of different income groups shows that unemployment influences the popularity of the government much more among those of middle income than those of high or low income. A greater part of the variation in popularity is also explained for this group than for the other groups.
Gender: We find that men and women respond in roughly a similar manner to unemployment and inflation.
The use of group specific measures of unemployment and of the food price inflation did not bring out any significant differences between these measures and (economy-wide) general measures of unemployment and inflation. Thus voters across age, income and gender appear to exploit the same informational sources when judging the economic performance of the government.
We raised the question initially of whether people learn with age and thus becoming more rational and knowledgeable. Our results are consistent with this view. However, the patterns obtained are also consistent with the view that voters' preferences are influenced by their economic status, since income moves upwards with growing age.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Assarsson, B. (1985). Prices and income distribution. Mimeo no. 1985:98. Department of Economics, University of Lund.
Chappell, H.W., and Keech, W.R. (1985). Political accountability for economic performance. The American Political Science Review 79: 10–27.
Fiorina, M.P. (1981). Short and long-term effects of economic conditions on individual voting decisions. In D.A. Hibbs, Jr and H. Fassbender (Eds.), Contemporary political economy. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Frey, B.S. (1978). Modern political economy. London: Martin Robertson.
Friedman, B. (1979). Optimal expectations and the extreme information assumptions of ‘rational expectations’ macromodels. Journal of Monetary Economics 5: 23–41.
Frydman, R., and Phelps, E. (Ed.) (1983). Individual forecasting and aggregate outcomes: ‘Rational expectations’ examined. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hibbs, D.A. (1982). The dynamics of political support for American presidents among occupational and partisan groups. American Journal of Political Science 26: 312–332.
Jonung, L. (1981). Perceived and expected rates of inflation in Sweden. American Economic Review 71: 961–968.
Jonung, L. (1984). Which model do people carry in their minds when they forecast inflation rates?, Seminar paper no. 1, National Institute of Economic Research, Stockholm.
Jonung, L., and Laidler, D. (1986). A test of rational perceptions. Mimeo, University of Lund.
Jonung, L., and Wadensjö, E. (1979). The effect of unemployment, inflation and real income growth on government popularity in Sweden. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 81: 342–353.
Jonung, L., and Wadensjö, E. (1986). Rational, adaptive and learning behaviour of voters. Meddelande fr»n Institutet för social forskning 3/1986, Stockholm.
Kirchgässner, G. (1985). Rationality, causality and the relation between economic conditions and the popularity of parties: An empirical investigation for the Federal Republic of Germany, 1971–1982. European Economic Review 28: 243–268.
McCallum, B.T. (1978). The political business cycle: An empirical test. Southern Economic Journal 44: 504–515.
Michael, R. (1979). Variation across households in the rate of inflation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 9: 32–46.
Minford, P., and Peel, D. (1982). Rational expectations and the new macroeconomics. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Mosley, P. (1984). ‘Popularity functions’ and the role of the media: a pilot study of the popular press. British Journal of Political Science 14: 117–133.
Muth, J.F. (1960). Optimal properties of exponentially weighted forecasts. Journal of the American Statistical Association (June): 299–306.
Paldam, M. (1981). A preliminary survey of the theories and findings on vote and popularity functions. European Journal of Political Research 9: 171–199.
Sargent, T.J. (1982). The ends of four big inflations. In R. Hall (Ed.), Inflation, Ch. 2. Chicago: NBER — University of Chicago Press.
Schneider, F. (1978). Different (income) classes and presidential popularity: An empirical analysis. Munich Social Science Review (2): 53–74.
Schneider, F. (1978a). Politisch-ökonomische Modelle: Ein theoretischer und empirischer Ansatz. Königstein/Ts: Hain.
Schneider, F., and Frey, B. (1986). Public attitudes toward inflation and unemployment and their influence on government behavior. In T.D. Willet (Ed.), Inflation and the political business cycle, forthcoming. San Francisco: The Pacific Institute.
Stigler, G.J. (1973). General economic conditions and national elections. American Economic Review 63: 160–167.
Taylor, J.B. (1975). Monetary policy during a transition to rational expectations. Journal of Political Economy 83: 1009–1021.
van Duyne, C. (1982). Food prices, expectations, and inflation. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64: 419–430.
Wickström, B.-A. (1984). Rationality and political choice: Government popularity in Norway 1964–1976. Mimeo. Paper presented at the Meeting of the European Public Choice Society in Munich, May 1984.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Financial support from the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We are greatly indebted to Ingemar Dahlstrand at the Lund Computer Center for skillful programming work. The authors would also like to thank Bengt Assarsson, Henry W. Chappell, Robert Goldsmith, Gebhard Kirchgässner, Henrik Jens Madsen, J. Nauman, Olof Petersson, Friedrich Schneider and Charles Stuart for helpful comments on earlier versions.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Jonung, L., Wadensjö, E. Rational, adaptive and learning behavior of voters: Evidence from disaggregated popularity functions for Sweden. Public Choice 54, 197–210 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125646
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125646