Public Choice

, Volume 70, Issue 2, pp 121–149 | Cite as

Rules and games

  • Roy Gardner
  • Elinor Ostrom
Article

Abstract

This paper reconsiders the relationship between the rules of a game and its outcomes. We develop a notion of rule reform that leads to the selection of Pareto improved equilibria points. We then apply this notion to a series of naturally occurring fishing rules, including examples from Malaysia, India, Brazil, Turkey, and Canada. We show that reforming a game is conceptually akin to reforming an economy.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roy Gardner
    • 1
  • Elinor Ostrom
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Economics, Workshop in Political Theory & Policy AnalysisIndiana UniversityBloomington
  2. 2.Department of Political Science, Workshop in Political Theory & Policy AnalysisIndiana UniversityBloomington

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