Abstract
In recent years, the political process has seemed to become increasingly favorable to issues involving women, as shown by the relatively large number of states which have passed the Equal Rights Amendment. The economic theory of politics would imply that this result would occur if the interests of women in removing labor force sex discrimination had increased. We argue that most sex descrimination in hiring and pay of women is in the form of statistical discrimination where sex is used as a proxy for labor force attachment. If this is so, then, on net, sex discrimination in employment practices would pay in the sense that the gainers from such behavior would gain more than the losers would lose. Married women would share in such gains since they would be compensated for their lower earnings by the higher earnings of their husbands. Single women, however, would receive no such compensation. We therefore hypothesize that the recent increase in legislation benefitting women is related to marriage rates, not to female labor force participation. Using votes in the state legislatures on the ERA as a measure of success by state of the women's movement, we find that our results do hold — number of single women is significant in explaining such voting but female labor force participation is not significant.
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The authors would like to thank Gordon Tullock, R. Carter Hill, and Chris Paul for helpful comments.
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Hunt, J.C., Rubin, P.H. The economics of the women's movement. Public Choice 35, 287–295 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124442
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124442