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Contractarian model of the decline in classical liberalism

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Auburn University, USA

    Randall G. Holcombe

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  1. Randall G. Holcombe
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James Buchanan and Robert Tollison have provided helpful comments on an earlier draft.

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Holcombe, R.G. Contractarian model of the decline in classical liberalism. Public Choice 35, 277–286 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124441

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